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FOREWORD: THE TENSION BETWEEN
INTERVENTION AND RESIGNATION
John B. Attanasio*
In a deep sense, tort law exhibits a tension between intervention and
resignation. In certain contexts, the law optimistically attempts to restore
the victim to the status quo ante. In others, it chides that legal institutions
can only partly avert the tragedy of the human condition. This schizoid
agenda has particularly characterized the development of the law of
product liability.
Prior to Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,' the
possibility of recovery generally lay locked behind the doors of privity.
Conceptualizing product liability in contract terms, courts routinely denied
recovery to victims who were not immediate buyers. 2 After MacPherson,
courts repeatedly blocked recovery for product victims by invoking me-
chanical and arbitrary formulations of negligence theory.' Even when
product liability blossomed during the 1960s, the tension between inter-
vention and resignation survived. The warranty provisions of the 1962
draft of the Uniform Commercial Code expanded contractual recovery
for product harms but retained substantial limitations, of which the most
notable was vertical privity. 4 Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts scythed a much broader path to recovery, the precise limits of
which were left indefinite by amorphous language. Following closely on
the heels of the Restatement, the 1966 proposed revisions of the U.C.C.
relaxed the vertical privity requirement to liberalize contractual recovery.'
These changes in the law paved the way for increased recoveries. By
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1. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2. 3 F. HARPER, F. JmAMS & 0. GRAY, TBE LAW OF TORTS 705-08 (2d ed. 1986); W. KEETON, D.
DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 681-82 (5th ed.
1984).
3. See, e.g., Tyson v. Long Manufacturing Co., 249 N.C. 557, 107 S.E.2d 170 (1959); Campo v.
Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N:E.2d 802 (1950). For the classic history of early movement toward
strict product liability, see Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
4. See J. WnrE & R. SUMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
399 (2d ed. 1980). Vertical privity excludes recovery from remote product sellers. This version
of the Code did, however, relax horizontal privity to permit guests and members of the buyer's
household to recover from the product's immediate seller. See id.
5. See J. WrT & R. SumamRs, supra note .4, at 399-405; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
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the mid-1970s, the federal government commissioned a task force on
product liability.6 That task force proposed to the states the Model
Uniform Product Liability Act, which sought to diminish the size and
number of product recoveries. 7 Initially, the states paid comparatively
little attention to calls for change, and Congress introduced assorted bills.
8
To date, Congress has failed to enact uniform legislation; instead, the
states recently have begun to curtail the possibility and amount of re-
covery. 9
Thus has the pendulum swung back and forth. Sometimes, we resolve
to do more; other times, we understand that we can only do just so
much. Tort scholars have tried to reconcile this tension between interven-
tion and resignation by accentuating autonomy or utility paradigms of
tort law. The unanticipated catastrophies of product accidents profoundly
infringe on both the freedom and happiness of victims. A compassionate
product liability system should be responsive to both of these interests.
In my view, the approach to product liability that most ably advances
utility and particularly autonomy was developed by Dean Guido Calabresi
of Yale Law School. 10
The scheme that Dean Calabresi formulated during the 1960s and
perfected during the early 1970s conceptualizes accident costs as part of
the total costs of a particular product, which should be internalized into
product price. Accident costs attributable to product assembly, design or
warning should be borne by the manufacturer, who, in turn, can generally
spread its losses to consumers of that product through higher prices."
This sharing of accident costs alleviates the burden of liability on the
manufacturer while advancing victim compensation. Moreover, at the
margin, higher product prices effected by internalization will reduce prod-
uct consumption and, concomitantly, accidents. 12 Internalization does not
unfairly constrain the autonomy to consume a given product; without it,
accident costs might have to be shouldered partly by general tax revenues
with the remainder absorbed by victims. In contrast to these arbitrary
burdens, internalization fairly allocates accident costs to those consumers
who benefit from a particular product.
Besides internalization of accident costs, the other revolutionary idea
of Calabresian theory is the "best-decider" approach. Specifically, tort
law should ascribe liability for product accidents to the party who has
6. See FINAL REPORT, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABIITY (1977) (National Technical
Information Service-Report No. 273-220).
7. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
8. See, e.g., H.R. 1115, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1985); S.
44, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983). See also Twerski, A Moderate and Restrained Federal Product
Liability Bill: Targeting the Crisis Areas for Resolution, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 575, 575-78
(1985).
9. See, e.g., NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, RESOLvrNG THE LimABrrY CRISIS: STATE
LEGISLATrVE ACTIVIIES IN 1986 (1987); Strasser, The States of Tort Reform, Nat'l L.J., Feb.
16, 1987, at 36, col. 1.
10. See Attanasio, The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the Calabresian Approach to Products
Liability, 74 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1988).
11. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1057 & nn.10-
11 (1972). This seminal idea of Calabresian theory is more extensively propounded in G.
CALARREsi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
12. See G. CALABRESi, supra note 11, at 150-52.
[Vol. 14:127
Foreword
superior knowledge with which to decide whether to avoid an accident or
allow it to occur. For example, a manufacturer often has the most
information with which to decide whether it is cheaper to design a safer
product or to forgo a particular safety measure and compensate accident
victims. Conversely, if a consumer sticks his hand into a running power
mower to unclog it, the consumer has the best information to decide
whether to take the chance of inserting his hand or to unclog the mower
in a less direct manner.
3
In many ways, Calabresian theory appeals to utility. It seeks to
address the deep utility incursions suffered by accident victims and to
avert only those accidents that are cheaper to avoid than to insure against.14
In a more distinct way, the theory appeals to autonomy. It seeks to
decrease and redress the severe autonomy infringements caused by product
accidents without unfairly constricting the autonomy of product con-
sumers. 5
Catalyzing the drive toward intervention, Calabresian theory has
powerfully influenced the courts toward strict product liability. Reacting
to perceived excesses, many recent legislative proposals have tended to
emphasize resignation. Some have tried to reject the Calabresian approach
altogether; generally, more successful measures simply have sought to
refine its implementation. Three important categories of reform have
emerged. First, many measures would reimpose a fault standard to deter-
mine liability. A second tack has involved limiting damages, particularly
punitive damages and damages for pain and suffering. A third thrust
focuses on reducing transaction costs: proffered solutions range from
spurring settlement to eliminating joint and several liability.
6
Unfortunately, some of these categories of reform conflict. For
example, substituting a fault hurdle for a relatively simple strict liability
approach likely would increase transaction costs. My own view is that
liability should be strict, but certain noneconomic damages, such as pain
and suffering, should be contained. The costs of product liability might
be reduced by promulgating a simple strict liability system, enacting a
national law to advance uniformity and placing some limits on nonecon-
omic damages and attorneys' fees. Elsewhere, I elaborate how some of
these ideas might be codified. '7
In an effort to advance debate in this important and controversial
area, the Journal of Legislation devotes this symposium issue to product
13. For further discussion, see Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 11, at 1062-67.
14. Attanasio, supra note 10.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Focus on "Tort Reform" Shifts to the States, Insurance, 1 Liab. & Ins. Bull. (BNA)
No. 23, at 6-7 (Jan. 12, 1987); Fault-Based Product Liability Rule Included in Measure Sent to
Governor, 1 Liab. & Ins. Bull. (BNA) No. 19, at 1-2 (Dec. 8, 1986); Strasser, Both Sides Brace
for Tort Battle, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 1, col. 3; 39, col. 3; Strasser, supra note 9, at
36, 40.
Indeed, litigation costs may be consuming almost as much money as victim compensation.
See J. KAArUK & N. PACE, CosTs AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LmoAnoN (1986) (Rand
Corporation Study).




liability. Consistent with the mission of the Journal, its staff has invited
prominent policy makers to examine an important question at the cutting
edge of law and public policy. In addition, the symposium contains two
student projects in which members of the Journal staff analyze topics
central to informed decision making.
In this issue, we are honored to feature Christopher Dodd, Victor
Schwartz and Alan Morrison. Dodd, the junior Senator from Connecticut,
has proposed several widely discussed bills on product liability. Schwartz
is former chairman of the Federal Interagency Task Force on Product
Liability and co-author of Prosser, Wade and Schwartz, Cases and Ma-
terials on Torts. Morrison is director of the litigation department for
Public Citizen and was a member of the recent American Bar Association
Action Commission to Improve the Tort Liability System.
Each of these authors is a prominent representative of what are
perhaps the three most influential and best developed positions on product
liability reform. Accentuating resignation, Schwartz's position reflects a
widely held perception that excess characterizes the current product liability
system. Those sharing this impression often favor fault-based liability,
cutbacks in damages and reduced transaction costs through uniform
federal legislation. Schwartz's article focuses on the need for federal
legislation. Transcending differences of opinion on specific reform pack-
ages, many would concur with Schwartz's arguments for national regu-
lation of an area that so vitally affects interstate commerce. Many who
in principle favor federal legislation, however, profoundly disagree on
what measures should be enacted. Ironically, the uniformity that federal
legislation would effect can intensify disagreement by increasing the im-
portance of whatever measures are promulgated.
Contrasting with Schwartz's position is the stance of Morrison. In
his commentary, Morrison rehearses the recommendations of the ABA
Action Commission on which he served. This Commission-which ad-
dressed more than product liability-eschewed broad-ranging change. In-
stead, it sought to tinker with the existing tort system, including product
liability. Accordingly, its approach would largely leave intact the basic
innovations that Calabresian theory has inspired in many states. Morri-
son's commentary reflects the procedural thrust of the Commission's
package. Many of the adjustments proffered by the Commission would
reduce transaction costs. When combined with its more substantive sug-
gestions, such as reducing punitive damages, these proposals would de-
crease the total cost of product liability. Although the ABA Action
Commission advances many sound recommendations, its package may
prove inadequate to address problems with the existing product liability
system. A potential advantage to the ABA approach is incremental change;
however, the pace of reform must adequately and deliberately respond to
the problems at hand.
Dodd articulates an approach that, at one level, lies between the
resignation toward which Schwartz would like to move and the intervention
that Morrison would like to retain. In another sense, the Senator's position
might be fashioned to spark even greater intervention than the current
[Vol. 14:127
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approach to product liability. By any standard, the Senator's ideas recast
the product liability debate in a dramatic way. After outlining some
problems with the present system, the Senator's article recounts the
principal thrust of his reform efforts, which have focused on alternative
compensation schemes. His most important efforts have sought to reduce
transaction costs and foster quick and certain victim compensation through
prompt settlement of disputes. The self-avowed theoretical predicate for
the Senator's proposals, again, is Calabresian theory.
The Senator's scheme holds the potential to bypass the tort system
and treat victims' problems with greater speed and certainty. Many bills
proffering compensation systems, however, have dramatically curtailed
damages and, more importantly, have incorporated substantial elements
of a fault approach. The Senator's article grapples with these criticisms
of past proposals. It may, however, neglect the problem of accurately
assessing product damages while continuing to incorporate substantial
elements of fault. It also continues to struggle with the predictable
problems of etching a boundary line between the tort system and an
alternative compensation mechanism.
Turning to the student projects, one focuses on how product liability
affects the vital insurance industry. Offering an historical perspective, this
project examines how our current system of insurance regulation evolved.
It then analyzes the continuing merits of that system. Another student
project focuses on some of the most important reforms being debated in
state legislatures. Included are sections on theories of recovery, the state
of the art defense, comparative responsibility, statutes of limitation and
of repose, punitive damages, joint and several liability, and various
measures to control litigation costs. These student projects are timely.
Increasingly, reform measures are embracing insurance regulation. More-
over, the present focus of efforts to modify the law clearly lies in state
legislatures.
The symposium illuminates the tension between intervention and
resignation which characterizes so many policy debates. How we as citizens
might help those who have suffered accidents and on whom we should
ascribe this burden test our value commitments. These questions, and the
tension between resignation and intervention that they engage, expose the
tragic side of life together with our capacity and will to respond.
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